Excess burden of taxation and environmental policy mix with a consumer-friendly firm by Leal, Mariel et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Excess burden of taxation and
environmental policy mix with a
consumer-friendly firm
Mariel Leal and Arturo Garcia and Sang-Ho Lee
Technologico de Monterrey, Mexico, Technologico de Monterrey,
Mexico, Chonnam National University, South Korea
July 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88256/
MPRA Paper No. 88256, posted 31 July 2018 03:44 UTC
1. Introduction
During the last generation, market-based environmental regulations have been salient features of economic
policies in polluting industries. The governments in developed and developing countries have continuously
conducted indirect environmental policies such as emission taxes and tradable emission permits. Many
economists have also shown that governments can promote social welfare by implementing market allocation5
of tradable emission permits or equivalently emission tax since it can minimize abatement costs when they
differ between the regulated firms. For example, Borenstein (1988), Malueg (1990) and Sartzetakis (1997)
showed that the tradable permits can increase social welfare in a sufficiently competitive production mar-
ket with pollution when there are differences with respect to the abatement technologies among regulated
firms. Due to its equivalence between tradable permits and emission taxes on the efficiency and welfare10
consequences, the widespread acceptance of tradable emission permits policy is getting increasing.1
On the other hand, climate change becomes a global challenge which requires not only setting the goals for
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions but also developing effective policy instruments to achieve them.
During the global climate change negotiations, tradable emission permits have emerged as an essential policy
tool. Nowadays, it becomes a successful international experiment for controlling a large amount of greenhouse15
gases in the world.2
However, the widespread acceptance of permits trading program generates an ongoing debate among
economists on the efficiency of environmental and climate change policy. For example, Requate (1993),
Sartzetakis (2004), Lee and Park (2005) and Garcia et al. (2018) demonstrated that if firms differ in both
production and abatement technologies, the tradable permits cannot always assure efficiency. Hence, ad-20
dressing the treatment of emission permits and offsets in both direct and indirect taxation is vital and
practical. Failure to deal with potential tax obstacles could make the desired reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions excessively costly and impede the global integration of carbon markets. Therefore, the appropriate
choice of policy instruments will be the stringency of the effective policies and economic efficiency.
This study analyzes the policy interplay between the tradable emission permits and emission tax policies.25
Our approach links two existing research lines of related works. First, contrary to the behavioral assumption
on the firms with homogeneous objectives of profit-maximization, we examine different objective functions
between the firms and investigate how the heterogeneity of objectives affects the equivalence. In particular,
1Since the United States implemented experimental permits trading systems such as the sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading
program, in which allowances were freely allocated under the Clean Air Act, many countries including the European Union,
Japan, Korea and China have introduced this program gradually. Stavins (1998), Kato (2006), Burtraw and McCormack (2017)
introduced some useful real-world discussions on the tradable emission permits in the United Nations and the United States.
2The European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) established in 2005 already covers about half of total greenhouse gas
emissions coming from Europe. With similar schemes under active consideration by a number of other countries, the share of
total emissions from developed countries covered by “cap and trade” or other tradable permit regimes could triple in a few
years. See OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/).
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we consider a production market which is characterized by the co-existence of for-profit firms and not-for-
profit firms. We regard a not-for-profit firm as a consumer-friendly firm and define the objective of this firm30
as a combination of consumer surplus and its profits. This type of model formulation is one way of adopting
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, in which it utilizes consumer surplus as a proxy of CSR
concern.3 Owing to the current expansion of CSR, the heterogeneity of objectives among the firms in this
market configuration is as an essential part of our analysis.4
Second, contrary to the revenue-neutral property of grand-fathering allocation of permits, we take account35
the excess burden of taxation as a public finance, which can reduce or increase the welfare loss. On the one
hand, we assume that the government utilizes a grandfathering approach for initial allocating of costless
permits to the firms because it has by far been the dominant allocation approach in practice, both because
it can offset the costs of emission reduction as well as for political reasons.5 On the other hand, the emission
tax revenue can provide double-dividend effect, which can be used for not only externality but for public40
finance to eliminate other distorting tax system such as income tax. However, the emission tax has also
its own distorting effects on labor supply, which can have the excess burden as a tax on labor income.6
Thus, the effect of the excess burden of taxation in environmental policies on the welfare consequences is an
important part of our analysis.
In this study, we examine a Cournot duopoly market with a consumer-friendly firm in which both firms45
have the same abatement technologies and emit the same pollutants in the presence of excess burden of
taxation. We then investigate the efficiency of policy mix between tradable permits and emission taxes. In
particular, we analyze the interplay between the two policies and find the equivalent conditions for welfare
3Recently, driven by capital market and industry associations, CSR has become a global mainstream business strategy.
For comprehensive discussions on recent CSR trends, see McWilliams and Siegel (2001), Benabou and Tirole (2010), Schreck
(2011), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) and Crifo and Forget (2015). Numerous theoretical studies that analyzed the CSR
activities in different competition models include Goering (2012, 2014), Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013,
2015), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Kopel (2015), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Leal et al. (2018) and Garcia et al.
(2018) among others.
4On the other hand, the analysis on mixed oligopolies where a welfare-maximizing public firm competes with profit-oriented
private firms has also become richer and more diverse. For example, the effects of environmental policies under different market
configurations are examined in Kato (2006), Ohori (2006), Wang and Wang (2009), Pal and Saha (2015), Xu et al. (2016a),
Hsu et al. (2017), Xu and Lee (2018) and Lian et al. (2018). However, these analyses have focused on the various factors that
affect the optimal privatization policies rather than the interplay between the environmental policies, which is main interest of
our approach.
5Recently, it is proposed to use a consignment auction which combines aspects of free allocation and auctioning into one
mechanism. See Stavins (1998), Fowlie (2010), Burtraw and McCormack (2017) and Khezr and MacKenzie (2018) for more
discussions.
6Laffont and Tirole (1986) and Lin and Tan (1999) argued that the government’s public policy might cause the welfare loss.
For more discussion on the emission taxes, see Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and Fullerton
(1997). Regarding the excess burden of taxation in a mixed market where a public firm competes with private firms, see also
Matsumura and Tomaru (2013, 2015) and Xu et al. (2016b).
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consequences. We obtain two main results. First, for the parameters under which the firm does not sell
all its emission quota, the government chooses the significant policy mix if the excess burden of taxation is50
large, whereas it chooses the single policy with permits otherwise. Second, for the parameters under which
the firm sells all its emission quota, the government always chooses the significant policy mix. It shows that
emission tax can be redundant and thus policy mix is degenerated when both excess burden of taxation
and the degree of consumer-friendliness are low. It also shows that when the excess burden of taxation is
significant, tradable permits policy with tax treatment is efficient to enhance welfare in the presence of a55
consumer-friendly firm. Finally, we show that when the degree of consumer-friendliness is sufficiently high
in which a consumer friendly firm is strongly aggressive in production, environmental policy mix is efficient
even in the tax revenue-neutral case where the excess burden of taxation does not matter.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a Cournot duopoly model
with a consumer-friendly firm emitting same pollutants. We analyze the policy mix with tradable permits60
and tax in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
We consider a quantity-setting Cournot duopoly model. One of the firms is a consumer-friendly (CF)
firm (hereafter referred to as firm 0) that cares for not only its profits but consumers surplus. The other is a
for-profit (FP) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 1) that maximizes only its profits. Firms sell homogeneous65
output, q0 > 0 and q1 > 0, respectively, at the market clearing price p(Q) = 1 −Q where Q = q0 + q1. We
assume that both firms have identical technologies and the production cost function takes a quadratic form,
c(qi) = q
2
i , i ∈ {0, 1}.
Production leads to pollution, ei ≥ 0, but each firm can reduce pollution by undertaking abatement
activities. We assume that each firm produces the same pollutants and has the same abatement technology.70
In particular, suppose that firm i chooses pollution abatement level zi > 0. Then, the emission level can be
reduced to ei = qi − zi by investing an amount of z
2
i
2 in abatement.
We consider a tradable permits regulation combined with a tax policy that the regulator uses to protect
the environment. The government assigns an emission quota, ξ0 = ξ1 = ξ > 0, to each firm and allow it to
trade emission permits at the market price. We assume that the emission market is perfectly competitive and
thus the market price of permits, λ > 0, is determined by the market clearing price.7 Thus, if we define the
7It implies that both firms do not have market powers in the competitive emission market and thus they behave as price
takers. Note that both firms have the market power in the products market and thus they behave as price makers. On the
other hand, we assume that an auctioneer in the competitive emission market can choose the emission market-clearing price
which equates the total supply (which is given) with the demand of emissions. See Sartzetakis (2004), Lee and Park (2005) and
Kato (2006). In Appendix F, we relax this assumption and consider a government-controlled competitive market, in which the
emission market price is determined by the demand and total supply of quotas, which is controlled by the government. In fact,
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net demand of firm i as Di = ei − ξ, total net demand of emission permits is zero at the market equilibrium
D0 +D1 = 0. The government, as well, might impose a tax on the emission level, for which the tax rate is t.
The resulting total tax revenue collected by the government is T = t
∑
i ei. The profit of firm i is given by:
pii = p · qi − q2i −
1
2
z2i − t · ei − λ · (ei − ξ) , i = 0, 1 (1)
Note that the firm i buys emission permits if ei − ξ > 0 while it sells if ei − ξ < 0 in the market price of
λ > 0.
We assume that the FP firm seeks only for profit maximization. However, the CF firm maximizes profits
plus a fraction of consumer surplus, CS = Q
2
2 . Thus, the payoff that CF firm maximizes is as follows
8
V0 = pi0 + θCS (2)
The parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of concern on consumer surplus that the CF firm has, which75
is exogenously given.
The extent of environmental damage due to pollution by the industry is given by
ED =
(∑1
i=0 ξi
)2
2
= 2ξ2 (3)
We assume that the government revenue from emission tax can be used to reduce tax rates in other
markets, which results in the reduction of dead weight loss due to distortionary taxation. That is, we
consider the excess burden of taxation, ρ ·T , where ρ represents the shadow cost of the government revenue,
which can be used to reduce the excess burden of taxation as a public finance. Notice that ρ can be positive80
or negative, but we assume that ρ > ρso(θ) =
−261+90θ−11θ2
540−198θ+18θ2 , which ensures the concavity of welfare function
where ρso(θ) < 0. It implies that the excess burden of taxation can cause either welfare-distorting effect or
welfare-enhancing effect.
Then, the social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus (CS), the profits of both firms (pi0 + pi1) and the
total taxes collected by the government (T) minus environmental damage (ED):
W = CS + pi0 + pi1 + (1 + ρ)T − ED (4)
The game is played as follows: In the initial stage, the permit price, λ, is given ex-ante where net demand
of emissions equals zero. Then, the government chooses emission quota ξ and tax rate t, expecting that λ is85
as Burtraw and McCormack (2017) and Khezr and MacKenzie (2018) mentioned, the inefficiency of tradable emission permits
may result from thin emission trading markets, weak price discovery, and regulatory or organizational complexities that hinder
recognition of opportunity costs and innovation.
8If we regard a representative consumer as a green-consumer who takes care of environmental damage into her utility, as
analyzed in Liu et al. (2015), we can define a net consumer surplus as NCS = CS − ED. Accordingly, we can also define
the objective function of a consumer-friendly firm as V0 = pi0 + θNCS, instead of pi0 + θCS, which might affect the analysis
with a consumer-friendly firm in general. However, it is interesting to note that all the results in the analysis still hold because
ED = 2ξ2 in (3) is fixed in the 3rd and 2nd stages under the given quotas.
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fixed, in the first stage. Having observed λ, ξ and t, both firms choose the abatement levels zi in the second
stage and outputs qi in the last stage.
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3. Optimal policy mix
The last stage firms 0 and 1 choose their outputs to maximize (2) and (1), respectively. By solving these
problems the equilibrium output as a function of the price of emission permits, λ, and tax rate, t ≥ 0, is
obtained:10
q0 =
(3 + θ)(1− t− λ)
3(5− θ) , q1 =
(3− θ)(1− t− λ)
3(5− θ) , Q =
2(1− t− λ)
5− θ (5)
In the second stage, firms choose abatement efforts to maximize their payoffs. Firm 0 chooses z0 ≤ q0
(which implies e0 ≥ 0) that maximizes (2) while firm 1 chooses z1 ≤ q1 (which implies e1 ≥ 0) that maximizes
(1). Thus, the analysis should allow for corner solutions. Let
Ω0 = V0 + µ0(q0 − z0) and Ω1 = pi1 + µ1(q1 − z1).
Then, the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for firms i = 0, 1 are stated as
∂Ωi
∂zi
= 0,
∂Ωi
∂µi
= qi − zi ≥ 0 and µi(qi − zi) = 0 where µi ≥ 0 and zi ≥ 0. (6)
These conditions are simplified as follows:
µ0 = µ1 = 0 for (θ, λ, t) ∈ R1; z0 = z1 = t+ λ (7)
µ0 = 0, µ1 = −3− θ − 2(t+ λ)(9− 2θ)
3(5− θ) for (θ, λ, t) ∈ R2; z0 = t+ λ, z1 = q1 (8)
µ0 = −3 + θ − 2(t+ λ)(9− θ)
3(5− θ) , µ1 = −
3− θ − 2(t+ λ)(9− 2θ)
3(5− θ) for (θ, λ, t) ∈ R3; z0 = q0, z1 = q1 (9)
where the regions Ri, i = 1, ..., 3 are defined in Appendix A.11
9In Appendix F, we consider a government-controlled competitive market where the market clearing permit price is deter-
mined after government chooses the emission quota and the tax rate, and then firms move later in which abatement choices are
taken in the second stage and output choices in the last stage. This is similar to the case that transactions occur at the market
clearing price in the financial markets where trade is centralized by a market operator. For more discussion on centralized
competitive market, see Moreno and Ubeda (2006). In the appendix, we can show that main findings of our analysis still hold
even under the given quotas determined by the government.
10It is interesting to note that the abatement choices in the second stage is not explicitly linked with the third stage equilibrium.
It is so because the consumer-friendly firm does not care for its rival’s profits and both firms use an end-of-pipe technology in
their abatement activities, which is separable and additive to the production. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for
pointing out this mechanism.
11In the analysis, we restrict our attention to the non-negative emission tax where t ≥ 0 for practical implications. However,
in Appendix G, we allow for emission subsidy where t < 0 and show that the policy mix is always assure the efficiency. This
implies that two policies are likely to give rise to a higher welfare than one policy in general. We are thankful to an anonymous
referee on this point.
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Lemma 1. Firm 0’s emissions are always positive, i.e., e0 > 0.90
Proof. e0 = 0 only if (θ, λ, t) ∈ R3. In this case, we also have e1 = 0. Then, the net demand
∑1
i=0Di =∑1
i=0(ξ − ei) = 2ξ > 0, which contradicts the assumption that the total net demand of emission permits is
zero at the market equilibrium, which means that the case where e0 = 0 never occurs.
Lemma 1 allows us to focus in regions R1 and R2 that correspond to the cases where (i) none of the
firms abates all contaminants, i.e., z0 = z1 = t + λ and (ii) firm 1 abates all contaminants, i.e., z0 = t + λ95
and z1 = q1, respectively.
3.1. None of the firms abates all contaminant, i.e, ei > 0, i = 0, 1 (Region R1)
In the first stage, the regulator choose simultaneously the emission quota ξ > 0 and the uniform tax t ≥ 0
to maximize welfare given in (4).
Max W = Q− Q
2
2
−
1∑
i=0
q2i −
1
2
1∑
i=0
z2i + ρt
(
Q−
1∑
i=0
zi
)
+ λ
(
2ξ −
(
Q−
1∑
i=0
zi
))
− 2ξ2
s.t. t ≥ 0, ξ > 0 (10)
The first order conditions are:
∂W
∂ξ
= λ(2)− 4ξ = 0 (11)
∂W
∂t
= (1−Q(t, θ, λ))∂Q
∂t
− 2
1∑
i=0
qi(t, θ, λ)
∂qi
∂t
−
1∑
i=0
zi(t, θ, λ)
∂zi
∂t
+ (ρt− λ)
(
∂Q
∂t
−
1∑
i=0
∂zi
∂t
)
(12)
+ ρ
(
Q(t, θ, λ)−
1∑
i=0
zi(t, θ, λ)
)
= 0
which yield
ξ =
λ
2
and t = max{0, t∗1} (13)
where t∗1 =
−(9−9θ−2θ2)(1−λ)+(45−9θ+(−270+99θ−9θ2)λ)ρ
261−90θ+11θ2+(540−198θ+18θ2)ρ . From (13), we have two cases: (i) significant policy
mix, i.e, t = t∗1 > 0 and (ii) single policy with permits, i.e., t = 0.100
3.1.1. Significant policy mix, i.e, t∗1 > 0
Making use of (5), (7) and (13) with t = t∗1 we can find the permit price that clears the permits market
D0 +D1 = 0 which yields:
λm =
2
(
9(7 + 6ρ)− 2θ2 − 9θ(2 + ρ))
H
(14)
where H = 9(101 + 132ρ)− 18θ(17 + 23ρ) + θ2(29 + 36ρ) > 0,
6
From (14), the equilibrium tax, emission quota, output and abatement levels are obtained:
tm1 =
3
(−3(3− 5ρ) + 2θ2 + 3θ(3− ρ))
H
ξm =
9(7 + 6ρ)− 2θ2 − 9θ(2 + ρ)
H
qm0 =
3(3 + θ)(18 + 23ρ− θ(3 + 4ρ))
H
qm1 =
3(3− θ)(18 + 23ρ− θ(3 + 4ρ))
H
zm0 = z
m
1 =
9(11 + 17ρ) + 2θ2 − 9θ(1 + 3ρ)
H
(15)
Finally, we have the resulting environmental damage and social welfare:
pim0 =
τ0 + τ1ρ+ τ2ρ
2
2H2
pim1 =
µ0 + µ1ρ+ µ2ρ
2
2H2
EDm =
2
(
9(7 + 6ρ)− 2θ2 − 9θ(2 + ρ))
H2
Wm =
3
(
σ0 + σ1ρ+ σ2ρ
2 + σ3ρ
3
)
H2
(16)
where τi, µi (i = 0, 1, 2) and σj (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) are as presented in Appendix B. Note that pi
m
i > 0, for i = 0, 1.
This implies that the policy mix might impose double financial burdens on the firms but its compliance cost
might not be significant since they can earn non-negative profits under the environmental regulations.105
3.1.2. Single policy with permits, i.e, t = 0
Making use of (5), (7) and (13) with t = 0 we can find the permit price that clears the permits market
D0 +D1 = 0 which yields:
λs =
2
17− 3θ (17)
From (17), the equilibrium emission quota, output and abatement levels are obtained:
ξs =
1
17− 3θ
qs0 =
3 + θ
17− 3θ
qs1 =
3− θ
17− 3θ
zs0 = z
s
1 =
2
17− 3θ (18)
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Finally, we have the resulting environmental damage and social welfare:
pis0 =
2
(
11− 3θ − 2θ2)
(17− 3θ)2
pis1 =
2
(
11− 6θ + θ2)
(17− 3θ)2
EDs =
2
(17− 3θ)2
W s =
2
(
30− 9θ − θ2)
(17− 3θ)2 (19)
Note that single policy mix does not increase firm’s compliance cost because it can earn non-negative profits
under the tradable emission permits regulation.
Lemma 2. In the case where e1 > 0, t
m
1 > 0 if ρ > ρ
m ≡ max{ 9−9θ−2θ215−3θ ,
−η4(θ)+
√
η3(θ)η5(θ)
36(6−θ)(17−3θ)2 } where
ηi(i = 3, 4, 5) are as presented in Appendix C.110
Proof. From (15), we can show that tm1 > 0 and W
m > W s if ρ > ρm; otherwise tm1 ≤ 0 or W s ≥Wm.
This lemma states that when both firms do not abate all emissions (ei > 0), policy mix with emission
tax treatment might be efficient under certain condition. It yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1. When firm 1 doesn’t sell all its emission quota under tradable emission permits policy, the
government should choose policy mix with emission tax treatment only if the shadow cost of the excess burden115
of taxation is high. Otherwise, the government can choose single policy with tradable emission permits.
This proposition implies that the excess burden of taxation has a significant role in determining the
efficiency of policy mix in environmental regulation. In particular, when the heterogeneity between the
firms is not significant and thus both firms actively compete in production and trade emissions, emission
tax treatment is useful only when its double dividend effect is meaningful. It also implies that the emission120
tax should be always positive when the excess burden of taxation is significant irrespective of the degree of
consumer-friendliness. Thus, the welfare effects of the excess burden of taxation interplay with the degree
of consumer-friendliness. Note that even under the tax revenue-neutral case where ρ = 0, policy mix can
be always optimal when θ ≥ 34
(−3 +√17) so that firm 0 is more aggressive in production. (See regions
in Appendix E.) It indicates that as the excess burden of taxation decreases, tax treatment with tradable125
emission permits policy is efficient when the heterogeneity between the firms is significant.
3.2. Firm 1 abates all contaminant e1 = 0 (Region R2)
If z0 = t+ λ and z1 = q1, at first stage the FOC (11) and (12) yield
ξ =
λ
2
and t = max{0, t∗2} (20)
where t∗2 =
−9+12θ+5θ2−4(9−3θ+2θ2)λ+3(5−θ)(3+θ−2(9−θ)λ)ρ
2(153−48θ+7θ2+6(9−θ)(5−θ)ρ) . Then, from (20) we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 3. In the case where e1 = 0, single policy with t = 0 is never optimal.
Proof. Use t = 0, z0 = t + λ = λ and z1 = q1 =
(3−θ)(1−λ)
3(5−θ) to obtain the permits price value that solves130
D0 + D1 = 0: λ = λ0 =
3−θ
33−5θ . Notice that for any 0 < θ < 1, (θ, λ = λ0, t = 0) /∈ R2, which means that
there is no price that clears the permits market for these equilibrium outcomes.
Thus, we have t∗2 > 0. Making use of (5), (8) and (20) we can find the permit price that clears the
permits market D0 +D1 = 0 which yields:
λm
′
=
(3 + θ)(3(4 + 3ρ)− θ(4 + ρ))
∆
(21)
where ∆ = θ2(9 + 8ρ)− 12θ(7 + 10ρ) + 9(35 + 48ρ) > 0.
From (21), the equilibrium tax, emission quota, output and abatement levels are obtained:
tm
′
2 =
(3 + θ)(θ(11− 3ρ)− 3(3− 5ρ))
2∆
ξm
′
=
(3 + θ)(3(4 + 3ρ)− θ(4 + ρ))
2∆
qm
′
0 =
(3 + θ)(3(13 + 17ρ)− θ(5 + 7ρ))
2∆
qm
′
1 = z
m′
1 =
(3− θ)(3(13 + 17ρ)− θ(5 + 7ρ))
2∆
zm
′
0 =
(3 + θ)(3(5 + 11ρ) + θ(3− 5ρ))
2∆
(22)
Finally, we have the resulting environmental damage and social welfare:
pim
′
0 =
(3 + θ)
(
υ0 + υ1ρ+ υ2ρ
2
)
8∆2
pim
′
1 =
κ0 + κ1ρ+ κ2ρ
2
8∆2
EDm
′
=
(3 + θ)2(3(4 + 3ρ)− θ(4 + ρ))2
2∆2
Wm
′
=
3
(
ψ0 + ψ1ρ+ ψ2ρ
2 + ψ3ρ
3
)
4∆2
(23)
where υi, κi (i = 0, 1, 2) and ψj (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) are as presented in Appendix D. Note also that pi
m′
i > 0, for
i = 0, 1. This also implies that the compliance cost under the policy mix might not be significant.135
Proposition 2. When firm 1 sells all its emission quota under tradable emission permits policy, the gov-
ernment should choose policy mix with emission tax treatment irrespective of the excess burden of taxation.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3. Let ρt = max{−36+39θ−θ227−45+6θ2 , ρw0 , ρw1}, where ρw0 is such that Wm
′
(ρw0 , θ) =
W s(ρw0 , θ) and ρw1 is such that tm
′
2 > 0 and W
m′(ρw1 , θ) = Wm(ρw1 , θ). If we compare the welfare between
(16) and (23), we can show that Wm
′
is the highest if ρ > ρt for any 34
(
5−√17) < θ < 1. (See regions in140
Appendix E.)
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Note that firm 1 completely abates all contaminants, i.e., z1 = q1, only when θ is sufficiently high. When
firm 0 is strongly aggressive in production, it will consume all the emission quotas in this industry. And
firm 1 sells all its emission permits to firm 0 by abating all contaminants under tradable permits policy. In
that case, emission permits market does not function efficiently because there is no room to reduce social145
cost by trading permits. Hence, it is natural to devise an appropriate tax treatment irrespective of the
effect of excess burden of taxation. Note that the emission tax should be always positive when the degree of
consumer-friendliness is significant. Therefore, the heterogeneity between the firms play a significant role in
determining the optimal policy mix in environmental regulation.
4. Concluding remarks150
This study considers an excess burden of taxation in a Cournot duopoly model with a consumer-friendly
firm and examines environmental policy mix between tradable permits and emission taxes. We analyze the
interplay between the two policies and find the equivalent conditions for welfare consequences. We show
that emission tax can be redundant and thus policy mix is degenerated when both excess burden of taxation
and the degree of consumer-friendliness are low. However, when the excess burden of taxation is significant,155
tradable permits policy with tax treatment is efficient to enhance welfare in the presence of a consumer-
friendly firm. Finally, when the degree of consumer-friendliness is sufficiently high in which a consumer
friendly firm is strongly aggressive in production, it consumes all emission permits and thus tradable permits
policy with tax treatment is efficient even in the tax revenue-neutral case. Therefore, the mixture of the
regulatory instruments matter for efficiency.160
Our analysis shows that the CSR initiatives of the firms and the excess burden of taxation for the
government can play significant roles in the design and implementation of environmental policy. However,
it needs to be further examined in alternative settings under different market structures. This has to be left
for future research.
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Appendix A. Regions
Define the following regions:
R1 ={(θ, λ, t) ∈ R3 | 0 < θ < 1, 0 < λ < 3−θ2(9−2θ) , 0 ≤ t < 3−θ−2λ(9−2θ)2(9−2θ) } (A.1)
R2 ={(θ, λ, t) ∈ R3 | 0 < θ < 1, 0 < λ < 3+θ2(9−θ) , max
{
3−θ−2λ(9−2θ)
2(9−2θ) , 0
}
≤ t < 3+θ−2(9−θ)λ2(9−θ) }
R3 ={(θ, λ, t) ∈ R3 | 0 < θ < 1, 0 < λ ≤ 1, max
{
3+θ−2λ(9−θ)
2(9−θ) , 0
}
≤ t ≤ 1− λ}
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Appendix B. Values of τi(θ), µi(θ),i = 0, 1, 2 and σj(θ), j = 0, 1, 2, 3
τ0 = 130653− 80838θ − 7983θ2 + 7056θ3 − 628θ4
τ1 = 325782− 201204θ − 19854θ2 + 17748θ3 − 1728θ4
τ2 = 206469− 128898θ − 11979θ2 + 11520θ3 − 1152θ4 (B.1)
µ0 = 130653− 115830θ + 38673θ2 − 5580θ3 + 344θ4
µ1 = 325782− 290628θ + 100026θ2 − 15300θ3 + 864θ4
µ2 = 206469− 186030θ + 65025θ2 − 10080θ3 + 576θ4 (B.2)
σ0 = 57267− 35640θ + 5517θ2 + 90θ3 − 58θ4
σ1 = 148554− 93474θ + 14652θ2 + 252θ3 − 152θ4
σ2 = 97983− 62154θ + 9807θ2 + 216θ3 − 96θ4
σ3 = 1620− 594θ + 54θ2 (B.3)
Appendix C. Values of ηi(θ)
η3 = 1233− 684θ + 11θ2 + 12θ3,
η4 = 24741− 11205θ + 2083θ2 − 223θ3 + 12θ4,
η5 = 772569− 533646θ + 139508θ2 − 15958θ3 + 587θ4 + 12θ5 (C.1)
Appendix D. Values of υi(θ), κi(θ),i = 0, 1, 2 and ψj(θ), j = 0, 1, 2, 3255
υ0 = 20655− 16929θ + 3345θ2 − 127θ3
υ1 = 53298− 43650θ + 8958θ2 − 558θ3
υ2 = 35451− 29169θ + 5985θ2 − 363θ3 (D.1)
κ0 = 56781− 37152θ + 9666θ2 − 1704θ3 + 169θ4
κ1 = 152118− 104004θ + 27648θ2 − 3996θ3 + 234θ4
κ2 = 103437− 73548θ + 19170θ2 − 2100θ3 + 81θ4 (D.2)
14
ψ0 = 27405− 12978θ + 1140θ2 + 146θ3 − 33θ4
ψ1 = 74520− 35856θ + 2880θ2 + 528θ3 − 88θ4
ψ2 = 51489− 24678θ + 1692θ2 + 470θ3 − 45θ4
ψ3 = 810 + 288θ − 60θ2 − 16θ3 + 2θ4 (D.3)
Appendix E. Region space
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Appendix F. The case when the government can control permits market price
In this Appendix, we assume that the emission market is a (government-controlled) centralized competi-
tive market in which polluters trade the permits at the realization of market-clearing price. The government
decides the total supply of permits and the tax rate in advance, by expecting the market price will be changed260
by its policy. Then, λ will be determined at the price where net demand is zero, given the fixed number of
permits, determined by the government. After that, by observing λ, ξ and t, both polluters choose zi in the
second stage and qi in the last stage. Then, the last and the second stages are the same as the original game,
therefore, equations (5), (7)-(9) show the results of this stages. Lemma 1 also holds, then we only focus on
regions R1 and R2.265
Appendix F.1. None of the firms abates all contaminant, i.e, ei > 0, i = 0, 1 (Region R1)
The government decides the total supply of permits and the tax rate in advance, by expecting the market
price will be changed by its policy. This price would be determined where the net demand D0 + D1 = 0,
then
15
λ1 =
1− e(5− θ)
6− θ − t (F.1)
Now the region R1 with λ = λ1 could be rewritten as follows:
R1 =
{
0 < θ < 1,
θ
2(9− 2θ) < ξ <
1
5− θ , 0 ≤ t <
1− (5− θ)ξ
6− θ
}
.270
In the first stage, the regulator choose simultaneously the emission quota ξ > 0 and the uniform tax t ≥ 0
to maximize welfare given in (4).
Max W = Q− Q
2
2
−
1∑
i=0
q2i −
1
2
1∑
i=0
z2i + ρt
(
Q−
1∑
i=0
zi
)
+ λ
(
2ξ −
(
Q−
1∑
i=0
zi
))
− 2ξ2 (F.2)
= Q− Q
2
2
−
1∑
i=0
q2i −
1
2
1∑
i=0
z2i + ρt(2ξ)− 2ξ2
=
63− 18θ − 2θ2
9(6− θ)2 +
(
2(63− 18θ − 2θ2)
9(6− θ)2 + 2ρt
)
ξ −
(
909− 306θ + 29θ2)
9(6− θ)2 ξ
2
s.t(θ, ξ, t) ∈ R1
Then we have the following results depending on the value of ρ and θ:
1. ρ < 0
If ρ < 0, then W in (F.2) strictly decreases on t, then it must take the smallest possible value t = 0,
this is a single policy with permits would be establish.
(a) If 0 < θ < 37
(
12−√95), then the maximum of W (with t = 0) is reached at ξ = 63−18θ−2θ2909−306θ+29θ2 .275
(b) However, if 37
(
12−√95) ≤ θ < 1 then W |t=0 decreases on ξ for any θ2(9−2θ) < ξ < 15−θ , then
ξ → θ2(9−2θ)
2. ρ = 0
If ρ = 0, (F.2) does not depend on t, so it can take any value such that 0 ≤ t < 1−(5−θ)ξ6−θ .
(a) If 0 < θ < 37
(
12−√95), then the maximum is reached at ξ = 63−18θ−2θ2909−306θ+29θ2 .280
(b) However, if 37
(
12−√95) ≤ θ < 1 then W decreases on ξ, then ξ → θ2(9−2θ)
3. ρ > 0
If ρ > 0, then W strictly increases on t, then t→ 1−(5−θ)ξ6−θ and
W →Wts =
63−18θ−2θ2+ξ(126−36θ−4θ2+(108−18θ)ρ)−ξ2(909−306θ+29θ2+(540−198θ+18θ2)ρ)
9(6−θ)2
(a) If 0 < θ ≤ 37
(
12−√95) or if 37 (12−√95) < θ < 1 and ρ > −63+72θ−7θ254−42θ+6θ2 , Wts is maximized at285
ξ = 63−18θ−2θ
2+9(6−θ)ρ
909−306θ+29θ2+(540−198θ+18θ2)ρ .
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(b) However, if 37
(
12−√95) < θ < 1 and 0 < ρ ≤ −63+72θ−7θ254−42θ+6θ2 then Wts decreases on ξ for any
θ
2(9−2θ) < ξ <
1
5−θ , then ξ → θ2(9−2θ)
Therefore, Proposition 1 still holds: When firm 1 doesn’t sell all its emission quota under tradable
emission permits policy, the government chooses policy mix with emission tax treatment only if the shadow290
cost of the excess burden of taxation is high. Otherwise, the government chooses single policy with tradable
emission permits.
Appendix F.2. Firm 1 abates all contaminant, i.e, e1 = 0 (Region R2)
The government decides the total supply of permits and the tax rate in advance, by expecting the market
price will be changed by its policy. This price would be determined where the net demand D0 + D1 = 0,
then
λ2 =
3 + θ − 6e(5− θ)
2(9− θ) − t (F.3)
Now the region R2 with λ = λ2 could be rewritten as follows:
R2 =
{
0 < θ < 1, 0 < e ≤ θ
2(9− 2θ) , 0 ≤ t <
3 + θ − (5− θ)6e
2(9− θ)
}
.
In the first stage, the regulator choose simultaneously the emission quota ξ > 0 and the uniform tax t ≥ 0
to maximize welfare given in (4).
Max W = Q− Q
2
2
−
1∑
i=0
q2i −
1
2
1∑
i=0
z2i + ρt
(
Q−
1∑
i=0
zi
)
+ λ
(
2ξ −
(
Q−
1∑
i=0
zi
))
− 2ξ2 (F.4)
= Q− Q
2
2
−
1∑
i=0
q2i −
1
2
1∑
i=0
z2i + ρt(2ξ)− 2ξ2
=
3
(
21− 4θ − θ2)
4(9− θ)2 + 2
(
2
(
9− θ2)
(9− θ)2 + tρ
)
ξ −
(
3
(
105− 28θ + 3θ2)) ξ2
(9− θ)2
s.t. (θ, ξ, t) ∈ R2
Then we have the following results depending on the value of ρ and θ:295
1. ρ < 0
If ρ < 0, then W in (F.4) strictly decreases on t, then it must take the smallest possible value t = 0.
(a) If 0 < θ < 32
(
13− 3√17), then W (with t = 0) increases on ξ, then ξ = θ2(9−2θ) .
(b) However, if 32
(
13− 3√17) < θ < 1 then the maximum of W (with t = 0) is reached at ξ =
2(9−θ2)
3(105−28θ+3θ2) .300
2. ρ = 0
If ρ = 0, (F.4) does not depend on t, so it can take any value such that 0 ≤ t < 3+θ−(5−θ)6e2(9−θ) .
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(a) If 0 < θ < 32
(
13− 3√17), then W increases on ξ, then ξ = θ2(9−2θ) .
(b) However, if 32
(
13− 3√17) < θ < 1 then the maximum of W is reached at ξ = 2(9−θ2)3(105−28θ+3θ2) .
3. ρ > 0305
If ρ > 0, then W strictly increases on t, then t→ 3+θ−(5−θ)6ξ2(9−θ) and
W →Wts2 =
3(21−4θ−θ2)
4(9−θ)2 + (3 + θ)
(
4(3−θ)
(9−θ)2 +
ρ
9−θ
)
ξ − 3
(
105−28θ+3θ2
(9−θ)2 +
2(5−θ)ρ
9−θ
)
ξ2
(a) If 0 < θ ≤ 32
(
13− 3√17) and ρ > 0 or if 32 (13− 3√17) < θ < 1 and ρ > − 36−39θ+θ227−27θ+4θ2 then Wts2
increases on ξ for any 0 < ξ ≤ θ2(9−2θ) , then ξ = θ2(9−2θ) .
(b) However, if 32
(
13− 3√17) < θ < 1 and 0 < ρ ≤ − 36−39θ+θ227−27θ+4θ2 then ξ = (3+θ)(12−4θ+(9−θ)ρ)6(105−28θ+3θ2+(90−28θ+2θ2)ρ) .310
Thus, Proposition 2 does not hold, but the optimal policy mix is still valid: When firm 1 sells all its
emission quota under tradable emission permits policy, the government chooses policy mix with emission
tax treatment only if the shadow cost of the excess burden of taxation is high. Otherwise, the government
chooses single policy with tradable emission permits.
Appendix G. The case when the government can implement emission subsidy where t < 0315
From Appendix A, we can define the following regions without any restriction on t:
S1 ={(θ, λ, t) ∈ R3 | 0 < θ < 1, λ > 0, −λ ≤ t < 3−θ−2λ(9−2θ)2(9−2θ) } (G.1)
S2 ={(θ, λ, t) ∈ R3 | 0 < θ < 1, λ > 0, 3−θ−2λ(9−2θ)2(9−2θ) ≤ t < 3+θ−2λ(9−θ)2(9−θ) }
S3 ={(θ, λ, t) ∈ R3 | 0 < θ < 1, λ > 0, 3+θ−2λ(9−θ)2(9−θ) ≤ t ≤ 1− λ}
The government’s problem is the same as in (4), except that there is no constraint on t, and W is concave
if ρ > ρso(θ). When the constraint ξ > 0 must be satisfied, Lemma 1 still holds. Thus, if none of the firms
abates all contaminant (Region S1), the emission quota and tax rate that satisfy ∂W∂ξ = 0 and ∂W∂t = 0 are:
ξ = λ2 and t = t
∗
1. But, if firm 1 abates all contaminant (Region S2), the emission quota and tax rate that
satisfy ∂W∂ξ = 0 and
∂W
∂t = 0 are: ξ =
λ
2 and t = t
∗
2. Therefore, the policy mix with emission tax or subsidy320
always assures the efficiency.
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